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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND
PRACTICES
In 1972, Congress enacted section 7010) of the Equal Opportunity
Act' which under certain circumstances requires employers to modify
facially neutral work policies when those policies conflict with an em-
ployee's religious belief or practice. This requirement, which is com-
monly referred to as the reasonable accommodation rule, can be
utilized by religious employees so as to ensure that they do not work on
their Sabbath. For example, an employee may be regularly scheduled
to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath. Under the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule, the employer is required to attempt to accommodate the em-
ployee's wishes if the employee does not want to work on his Sabbath.
The rule requires the employer to accommodate the religious practices
of his employees unless such accommodation results in undue hard-
ship.
The establishment clause of the first amendment provides that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. ' 2
Under the current United States Supreme Court analysis, the establish-
ment clause requires that when government action touches on a reli-
gious sphere it must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; it must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and it
must avoid excessive entanglement with religion. 3
The thesis of this note is that when Congress placed an affirmative
obligation upon employers to accommodate religious practitioners, it
contravened the establishment clause. The note first discusses the stat-
utory development of the reasonable accommodation rule. Then the
note discusses the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the ac-
commodation requirement. Finally, the constitutionality of the reason-
able accommodation rule under the establishment clause will be
discussed.
STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
RULE
The ban on religious discrimination originated in title VII of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Title VII bans discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of certain prohibited criteria by providing that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5
Much of the congressional debate that led to the enactment of title
VII focused primarily on the pervasive history of racial discrimination
in the United States and the debilitating effects of such discrimination
on employment. 6 Perhaps in recognition of the fact that discrimination
based on certain other characteristics was equally destructive, Congress
included without much debate other forms of prohibited classifica-
tions.7 Among the other prohibited employment practices was religious
discrimination.
It should not be surprising that religion was included in title VII as
a prohibited criterion for employment decision-making. Religious
freedom has always been an important concept in American history, as
evidenced by the religion clauses of the first amendment.8 Further-
more, title VII was patterned in part after state fair employment prac-
tices legislation which typically included religion as a prohibited
classifying factor.9 Thus, Congress remained true to the policy of reli-
gious liberty by making religious discrimination an unlawful employ-
ment practice.
The original thrust of title VII was a negative mandate for employ-
ers. The employer was required to refrain from utilizing race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin as a criterion for granting or withhold-
ing employment opportunities. In 1966, however, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission departed from this negative mandate in
the area of religious discrimination.
The 1966 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guide-
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) [hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as
title ViI].
5. Id § 2000e-2. The constitutional basis for title VII was derived from Congress' power to
regulate commerce. 100 CONG. REC. 1528 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
6. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 11517 (1964); 109 CONG. REC. 3245-49 (1964).
7. Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role ofArbitration Under Title VII,
69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 600 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Edwards & Kaplan]; see also 110
CONG. REC. 1528-29 (1964).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides, in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. ...
9. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 7, at 600.
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lines on religious discrimination' 0 stipulated that private employers not
only must abstain from using religion as a decision-making factor, but
also had an affirmative duty "to accommodate to the religious needs of
employees. . . where such accommodation can be made without seri-
ous inconvenience to the conduct of business."" Apparently, the
EEOC decided placing an affirmative obligation on the employer was
necessary to effect the modification of neutral employment policies
when a conflict arose between an employee's religious practices and
uniform work rules, unless such preference or change in employment
policies resulted in "serious inconvenience" to the employer's business.
In 1967, the EEOC promulgated a new set of guidelines' 2 which
placed a greater burden on private employers. The 1967 guidelines
compelled an employer "to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees or prospective employees where such ac-
commodation can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business."' 3 The guidelines also placed the burden on
the employer to prove that the proposed accommodation would result
in undue hardship.14 Essentially, these guidelines went beyond merely
augmenting the affirmative obligation previously placed on the em-
ployer by the 1966 guidelines and instead equated the failure to accom-
modate with religious discrimination.' 5
The reasonable accommodation requirement may have evolved
from the recognition that facially neutral employment policies can have
a disparate impact upon protected classes. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. ,16 the United States Supreme Court held that benign employment
policies can violate title VII if they are discriminatory in effect. Argua-
bly, the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship requirement was
nothing more than a codification of the "business necessity"' 7 test
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1966). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is hereinaf-
ter referred to as the EEOC.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.l(a)(2) (1966) (emphasis added).
12. Id. § 1605 (1967). These guidelines were incorporated into the 1972 amendments to title
viI.
13. Id § 1605.1(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
14. Id § 1605.1(c) provides: "Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or
refusing to hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the
burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to religious
needs of the employee unreasonable."
15. Id
16. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that facially neutral employment
policies will be deemed to violate title VII if the employee can show that the policies had a dispa-
rate impact upon a protected class. The employer can justify such policies by a showing of "busi-




enunciated in Griggs. This analogy, however, probably proves too
much because the "undue hardship" mandate demands more than just
a showing of job-relatedness, which is the touchstone of the business
necessity inquiry.' 8 For instance, religious beliefs which dictate specific
dress and grooming habits are conceivably protected under the reason-
able accommodation analysis. ' 9 In contradistinction, some courts have
found that dress and grooming modes are not protected under the sex
discrimination prohibition in title VII.2o In addition, the 1967 guide-
lines equated failure to accommodate with religious discrimination by
shifting the burden on the employer to prove that accommodation




This shift of the burden of proof is entirely different from a dis-
crimination claim which alleges that a facially neutral employment pol-
icy has a disparate impact upon a protected class. For example, in a
claim based on other prohibited forms of discrimination, the employee
must first allege and prove a prima facie case.22 Then, the burden shifts
to the employer to justify its actions by some legitimate business neces-
sity.2 3 However, in religious discrimination cases under the 1967
guidelines, once the employee alleged that an otherwise neutral em-
ployment policy interfered with the employee's religious practices, the
burden was on the employer to show that accommodation of the needs
of a religious employee would result in undue hardship.2 4 Thus, once
an employment-religious conflict was shown, the employer was pre-
sumed, albeit rebuttably, to have committed an unfair employment
practice. This presumption was rebuttable by a showing of undue
hardship on the employer's business operations.
18. Id
19. See EEOC v. Rollins, Inc., 8 FEP 492 (N.D. Ga. 1974), in which the court refused to
hold, as a matter of law, that an employer's refusal to allow a Black Muslim employee to wear
certain religious clothing may not amount to religious discrimination under title VIL.
20. See, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (different
grooming standards for men and women did not constitute sex discrimination). But see Carroll v.
Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3602
(U.S. March 18, 1980) (requiring women but not men to wear uniforms when both groups perform
the same functions constituted sex discrimination).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1978).
22. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which involved racial
discrimination in hiring. The Court held that the plaintiff carries the initial burden by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id at 802. The Court felt that this analysis was adaptable to other fact patterns. Id at 802 n. 13.
23. Id at 798. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1979).
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The 1967 guidelines were tested in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. 25
In Dewey, after an employer instituted a seven-day work week, an em-
ployee was discharged after he refused because of his religious beliefs
to work on Sunday or to find a replacement. The district court held for
the employee, finding that the employer had not shown that any ac-
commodation would result in "undue hardship. ' 26 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the em-
ployer's attempt at accommodation was sufficient. 27 However, the
court went on to question the EEOC's statutory authority to place upon
the employer an affirmative obligation to accommodate employees' re-
ligious practices.28 Even if the EEOC had such statutory authority, the
Sixth Circuit felt that an expansive interpretation of the duty to accom-
modate "would raise grave constitutional questions of violations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. '29
Congress responded to Dewey in 1972 by enacting section 7010) of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act which incorporated the af-
firmative duty to accommodate into title VII by providing that:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless the employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance without undue hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's business.30
The first half of section 7010) broadly construes the meaning of
religion in employment contexts.3' By enacting section 701(j), Con-
gress intended to protect both subjective beliefs as well as the objective
manifestations of those beliefs. The second half of section 7010) incor-
porates the 1967 guidelines concerning accommodation of the religious
practitioner. Thus, Congress placed an affirmative obligation on em-
ployers-absent undue hardship--to adjust work policies when such
policies conflicted with the religious practices of employees. The net
result of this legislation is that religious employees were to be treated
differently from other employees. Thus, Congress directed that em-
ployers are obligated to give employment preferences to religious ob-
25. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aJ'dmem., 402 U.S. 950 (1971).
26. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
27. 429 F.2d at 331. The employer attempted to accommodate the employee by allowing him
to find a replacement for the days he would not work.
28. Id at 331 n.l.
29. Id at 334.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
31. The reason for the broad definition of religion is that the first amendment's free exercise
clause probably precludes a narrower definition of religion. See, e.g., Boyan, Defining Religion in
Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1969).
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servers, unless such preference results in undue hardship. An example
of such preference is Fridays off for the Sabbath observer.
Section 7010) was introduced in Congress by Senator Randolf
from West Virginia. 32 Senator Randolf was primarily concerned with
the Sabbatarian observer. In that regard, he stated:
I am sure that my colleges [sic] are well aware that there are several
religious bodies. . . not large in membership, but with certain strong
convictions, that believe that there should be steadfast observance of
the Sabbath and require that the observance of the day of worship,
the day of the Sabbath, be other than Sunday. On this day of wor-
ship work is prohibited whether that day fall on Friday, Saturday, or
Sunday.33
Senator Randolf was also concerned about employment policies
that conflict with Sabbatarian practices and the impact of this conflict
on the employee's religious organization. The senator stated:
[T]here has been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to
hire or continue to hire in employment employees whose religious
practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the nature of
hire on particular days. So there has been . . . a dwindling of the
memberships of some. . . religious organizations. . . .My own pas-
tor. . . has expressed his concern and distress that there are certain
faiths that are having a very difficult time . . .[because of] possible
inability of employers on some occasions to fit the requirements of
the faith of some of their workers. 34
Senator Randolf also stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was in-
tended "to protect the same rights in private employment as the Consti-
tution protects in Federal, State, or local governments." 35 He also saw
no constitutional difficulties with section 701(j), noting that the reason-
able accommodation/undue hardship standard promotes the free exer-
cise of religion.
Thus, according to Senator Randolf, whose testimony dominated
the congressional discussion, the reasons for the reasonable accommo-
dation rule were: (1) that some religions organizations' memberships
are decreasing due to conflicts between employment policies and the
respective Sabbaths of those religions; (2) that the Civil Rights Act ban
on religious discrimination, at least in part, arose from the idea that the
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty should be extended to pri-
vate employment contexts; and (3) that these goals can be accom-
plished by regulating private conduct to the extent of compelling
accommodation of a religious employee's beliefs or practices.





THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION RULE
Although the duty to accommodate an employee's religious prac-
tices and beliefs first appeared in the 1966 EEOC guidelines on reli-
gious discrimination, 36 the scope of the employer's obligation remained
unsettled. In three cases, the United States Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the issue as to how far an employer must go before accom-
modation becomes an undue hardship. In the first two cases, an
equally divided Court summarily affirmed the appellate court decision
without an opinion.37 In the third case, Trans WorldAirlines v. Hardi-
son,38 the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion as to the
scope of the employer's duty.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals,39 Dewey, the employee, was dis-
charged because of a conflict between his Sabbath and the employer's
working policy. Dewey felt that working on his Sabbath or finding a
replacement were both sins.4° The employer offered no more accom-
modation than allowing Dewey to find a replacement to fill his position
on his Sabbath. Dewey urged the court to construe the accommodation
requirement so as to allow him to observe his Sabbath and still retain
his job. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
jected this argument and reasoned that to require the employer to do
more than allowing the religious practitioner to obtain a replacement
employee, would force the employer to distribute employment oppor-
tunities on an unequal basis.4 ' The Sixth Circuit held that such a result
was prohibited by title VII.42
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on Dewey v.
36. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
37. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aft'dmem., 429 U.S. 65 (1976);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff dmem, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
38. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
39. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dmem., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
40. 429 F.2d at 331.
41. Id. at 330.
42. The Sixth Circuit stated:
The reason for Dewey's discharge was not discrimination on account of his religion;
it was because he violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered
into by his union and his employer, which provisions were equally applicable to all em-
ployees....
To accede to Dewey's demands would require Reynolds to discriminate against its
other employees by requiring them to work on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby
relieving Dewey of his contractual obligation. This would constitute unequal adminis-
tration of the collective bargaining agreement among employees, and could create cha-
otic personnel problems and lead to grievances and additional arbitrations.
Id at 330-31 (emphasis added).
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Reynolds Metals Co. ,43 but was unable to reach agreement as to the
meaning of the reasonable accommodation rule. An equally divided
Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding.44
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,4 5 like Reynolds Metals, involved a
claim by a Sabbatarian observer that his religious practices conflicted
with otherwise neutral work policies. The employer attempted to find a
replacement employee; however, this plan proved unworkable. Cum-
mins, a plant supervisor, could only be replaced by other plant supervi-
sors, and that resulted in a considerable imbalance in the work
schedule. During one period, Cummins worked forty hours per week,
while the remaining supervisors were forced to work seventy hours per
week.46 This imbalance caused considerable discontent among the
other supervisors and, after receiving numerous complaints, the em-
ployer discharged Cummins.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the employer had not satisfied its obligation to accommodate the reli-
gious practices of its employee. The court stated that "[if employees
are disgruntled because an employer accommodates its work rules to
the religious needs of one employee, under [the reasonable accommo-
dation rule] such grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to
practice his religion. '47 Moreover, the court found that only if morale
problems became sufficiently serious to cause "chaotic personnel
problems, '48 could the employer properly discharge the Sabbath ob-
server. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on Cum-
mins v. Parker Seal Co.4 9 and an equally divided Court affirmed the
appellate court's decision.5 0
The third case reaching the United States Supreme Court involv-
ing the conflict between a religious employee's Sabbath and an em-
ployer's work policy was Trans World Airlines v. Hardison.5' The
Sabbath observer in Trans World, Hardison, was employed by Trans
World Airlines52 in a department that operated twenty-four hours a
day.53 The company and the International Association of Machinists &
43. 400 U.S. 1008 (1971).
44. 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
45. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affdmem., 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
46. 516 F.2d at 548.
47. Id at 550.
48. Id
49. 424 U.S. 942 (1975).
50. 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
51. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
52. Hereinafter referred to as TWA or the company.
53. 432 U.S. at 66.
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Aerospace Workers had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which provided for a seniority system whereby the most senior employ-
ees had first choice for job and shift assignments as they became avail-
able, while the most junior employees chose from the remaining job
and shift assignments. 54
Hardison's religions beliefs prohibited him from working on Sat-
urdays, his Sabbath. Initially, it was possible to accommodate Hardi-
son's religious beliefs because on his particular job he had sufficient
seniority to observe his Sabbath.55 However, when Hardison sought
and was subsequently transferred to a new job where he had lower
comparative seniority, he could not avoid schedules which infringed
upon his Sabbath observance. 56 TWA offered to permit the union to
change its work assignments, but the union was unwilling to violate the
seniority system and Hardison had insufficient seniority to bid for a
shift having Saturdays off. TWA rejected a proposal that Hardison
work only four days a week because it would impair critical functions
in the airline's maintenance operations. 57 TWA subsequently arrived at
the conclusion that no accommodation was available and discharged
Hardison for refusal to work on Saturdays.
Hardison instituted an action based on the reasonable accommo-
dation requirements contained in both the 1967 EEOC guidelines and
the 1972 amendments to title VII. The district court ruled in favor of
both the union and TWA, finding that the union could not be com-
pelled to ignore a valid seniority system and that TWA had satisfied its
obligation to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment for the union, but reversed as to TWA. 58 The Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that TWA could have satisfied its obligation without undue
hardship by: (1) permitting Hardison to work a four-day week and
replacing Hardison by a supervisor or another employee on duty else-
where, even though this would cause shop functions to suffer;59 (2)
filling Hardison's Saturday shift from other available personnel, al-
though this would have required TWA to bear the cost of premium
overtime pay;60 or (3) arranging a "swap" between Hardison and an-
other employee for another shift or for the Sabbath days, although this
54. Id at 67.
55. Id at 68.
56. Id
57. Id at 76.
58. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
59. 432 U.S. at 76.
60. Id
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would have been a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 6'
Both defendants challenged the Sixth Circuit's decision on statu-
tory and constitutional grounds. TWA and the union alleged that they
had fulfilled their statutory obligation to accommodate religious be-
liefs.62 Moreover, they argued that any further accommodation would
be inconsistent with the first amendment's establishment clause.63 In a
seven to two decision, the United States Supreme Court agreed with
defendants' statutory argument and found that both TWA and the
union had satisfied their obligation to the employee. 64 Thus, the Court
never reached the constitutional issue.65
The thrust of the union's and TWA's challenge was that collective
bargaining agreements further the basic policy of industrial stability in
the United States. Therefore, seniority agreements, which are an essen-
tial stabilizing factor in a collective bargaining agreement, should not
be breached to accommodate religious beliefs which conflict with the
seniority system. Also, the defendants challenged the scope of the duty
to accommodate by arguing that their attempts to conform to the em-
ployee's demands were sufficient.
The United States Supreme Court weighed these arguments
against Hardison's assertion that the express will of Congress required
employers to accede to employees' religious demands absent a finding
of undue hardship. The Court struck the balance in favor of employers
and unions. The Court acknowledged that public policy favors indus-
trial stability through collective bargaining and indicated that the sen-
iority system itself represents a significant accommodation to both the
religious and secular needs of employees. 66 In this regard, the Court
stated that "the seniority system represents a neutral way of minimizing
the number of occasions when an employee must work on a day that he
would prefer to have off."67 The Court concluded that, absent a dis-
61. Id at 76-77.
62. Id at 70.
63. Id
64. Id at 77.
65. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afdby an equally divided
court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) and Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affdby
an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to
the reasonable accommodation rule, along with a question of statutory interpretation. Both times,
the Court granted certiorari, but was unable to reach agreement on the issues. Perhaps this shows
a reluctance by the Court to confront establishment clause or free exercise issues in the employ-
ment area. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), the Court
limited the jurisdiction of the NLRB to secular institutions arguably because of the grave constitu-
tional issues that would have been engendered by a contrary holding.
66. 432 U.S. at 78.
67. Id
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criminatory purpose, a bona fide seniority system should not be vio-
lated in order to accommodate an employee's religious practices and
that title VII does not require employers to deny the shift and job pref-
erences of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual
rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious practices of
some other employees. 68 The Court held that to require an employer to
bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating religious practices
is equivalent to undue hardship. 69 Finally, the Court held that section
7010) equates an employer's failure to accommodate with an unlawful
employment practice.70
As the dissenting opinion in Trans World emphatically stated, the
majority's decision may well have struck a "fatal blow to all efforts
under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious prac-
tices.".71 The Trans World decision does severely limit the scope of an
employer's duty to accommodate. However, it appears that the out-
come in the case was required by the establishment clause of the Con-
stitution.
The Trans World holding rests upon two basic policies: (1) that
collective bargaining, and in particular a negotiated seniority system,
should not be disturbed, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose,
and (2) that regulating private conduct to the extent of mandating pref-
erential treatment on the basis of religion raises serious constitutional
questions. For example, if the Court had construed the statute broadly
so as to have required accommodation, then the Court would have con-
fronted the question of whether or not accommodation of religious
practices contravened the first amendment. Instead, the Court nar-
rowly construed the statute to avoid this dilemma and followed the
general proposition that a statute should not be construed to impose
this duty unless such interpretation is unavoidable.
By upholding TWA's seniority system, the Court reaffirmed the
long-recognized policy of achieving industrial stability through collec-
tive bargaining. Support for this policy is found in title VII's statutory
scheme. Section 703(h) provides that:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
... differentiate terms, conditions or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority system ... provided that such differ-
ences are not a result of an intention to discriminate because ... of
68. Id at 81.
69. Id at 84.
70. Id at 74.
71. Id at 86 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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religion.72
Thus, the Court furthered the stated goals of our national labor
policy by refusing to disturb the seniority system. However, the Court
had been willing to order the bypass of seniority systems in some previ-
ous title VII actions. For example, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. ,73 the Court stated that the thrust of section 703(h) was directed at
defining what is or is not an unlawful employment practice, and that
section did not bar the remedial award of retroactive seniority to vic-
tims of past racial discrimination.74 Bowman Transportation and Trans
World can be distinguished. In Bowman Transportation, the Court
held that a collective bargaining agreement could not be used to bar the
remedying of the effects of past racial discrimination. 75 In Trans
World, the alleged discrimination supposedly resulted from the admin-
istration and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, the critical distinction lies in the difference between remedying
proven illegal discrimination and proving illegal discrimination. In the
first case, the illegal employment practice was already established and
the Court permitted modification of the collective bargaining agree-
ment to afford relief. In Trans World, the refusal to modify the uni-
form application of the collective bargaining agreement was the alleged
illegal employment practice. 76 Therefore, section 703(h) mandates that
a bona fide collective bargaining agreement will prevail absent proof of
a discriminatory purpose.
The Court also felt that regulating private conduct to the extent of
granting religious preferences to some employees was inconsistent with
the purposes of title VII. In this regard, the Court emphasized that the
"unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history
of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such
discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as
well as minorities. .... ,,77 Truly, this was a recurring theme through-
out the majority's opinion. In holding that the seniority system barred
accommodation of Hardison's religious beliefs, the Court stated that
"to. . . give Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive
another employee of his shift preference at least in part because he did
not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath. '78 In ad-
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
73. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
74. 424 U.S. at 758.
75. Id at 761-62.
76. 432 U.S. at 82-83 n.13.
77. Id at 81.
78. Id
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dition, the Court emphasized that "[ilt would be anomalous to con-
clude that by 'reasonable accommodation' Congress meant that
employers must deny the shift and job preferences of some employees,
as well as deprive them of their [seniority] rights, in order to accommo-
date or prefer the religious needs of others. .... 79
By declaring that requiring the employer to bear more than de
minimis cost in accommodating religious practices is inconsistent with
title VII, the Court reaffirmed the principle that granting religious pref-
erences is incompatible with title VII unless such preferences are reme-
dial. Like the abandoning of a valid seniority system, compelling an
employer to bear additional costs where such costs are incurred for
other employees requesting days off would involve the unequal distri-
bution of employment benefits along religious lines.80 To require such
unequal treatment would conflict with the philosophy of title VII. As
the Court stated: "[T]he paramount concern of Congress in enacting
Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in employment. In the
absence of clear statutory language to the contrary, we will not construe
the statute to require an employer to discriminate against some em-
ployees to enable others to observe their Sabbath."8'
Thus, the Trans World Court implicitly recognized that the rea-
sonable accommodation requirement is essentially a call for affirmative
action relating to religious beliefs. Like an affirmative action program,
the obligation to accommodate compels preferential treatment of pro-
tected classes without any judicial determination of an illegal employ-
ment practice. The Court was in the uncomfortable position of having
to choose between narrowly construing the reasonable accommodation
rule or mandating religious preferences. The Court chose the path of
least resistance: narrow construction. If the rule mandated religious
preferences, serious constitutional questions would have been raised.
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Religious freedom has been a fundamental theme in American
history. Religious persecution by the state and any union of church
and state are both repugnant to American beliefs. The first amendment
reflects these ideas by providing that: "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
79. Id
80. Id at 84.
81. Id at 85.
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thereof. . . ",82 The prohibition of religious legislation has a dual as-
pect. The establishment clause forbids compulsion by law of the ac-
ceptance of any religion, while the free exercise clause guards against
the inhibition of any form of religion. The United States Supreme
Court aptly summarized the interrelation between the establishment
and free exercise clauses as follows: "The structure of our government
has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institu-
tions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured re-
ligious liberty from the invasion of civil authority. ' 83 However, this
statement is deceptively simple. For instance, Sunday closing laws are
legislation "respecting the establishment of religion" in the sense that
religions that observe Sunday as Sabbath will be benefited by such
laws. Also, when the state forces a businessman whose Sabbath is Sat-
urday to close on Sunday, the state is arguably burdening that person's
free exercise of religion. However, the Supreme Court has upheld Sun-
day closing laws in the face of such challenges.8 4 The free exercise
clause and the establishment clause, as indicated in the Sunday closing
cases, tend to overlap in some situations.
An inherent tension exists between the two clauses. If a state af-
firmatively promoted the free exercise of religion, the state, in a sense,
would be establishing a religion or at least favoring religion over
nonreligion. For example, permitting Bible readings in public schools
could be viewed as furthering the free exercise of religion or, instead, as
establishing a religion. The Court has disapproved of religious read-
ings in public schools as inconsistent with the establishment clause.85
Moreover, the Court has held that compulsory public school attend-
ance is violative of the free exercise clause, if the school attendance
conflicts with religious beliefs. 86 Thus, the pervasive theme in constitu-
tional jurisprudence involving the religion clauses has been the struggle
"to find a neutral course between the two religion clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if extended to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with each other."87
In analyzing the interaction between these two clauses, it is impor-
tant to focus on two policies underlying the first amendment, volunta-
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 730 (1872).
84. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
85. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
86. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. Walsh v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
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rism and separatism.88 The concept of voluntarism is basic to both of
the religion clauses.89 In the free exercise context, voluntarism is fur-
thered by proscribing any degree of compulsion in matters of belief.90
The establishment clause embodies this principle by insuring that sup-
port for religion comes from the voluntary activity of its followers and
not from the political support of the state.91 The ideal of separatism is
essentially an establishment clause concept. At the very least, separa-
tism means an institutional separation of church and state.92 But it also
means that the state should not be involved in religious affairs and that
sectarian differences should not be allowed to fragment the public by
the enactment of nonsecular legislation.
93
The next section of this note will review the constitutional analysis
that has evolved from the establishment clause. Then the question of
whether the employer's obligation to accommodate religious practices
is inconsistent with the establishment clause will be examined.
The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause of the first amendment has been charac-
terized as the erection of a wall between church and state.94 Essen-
tially, establishment clause analysis evolved from a theory of
separatism;95 the state and the church should intermingle as little as
possible. However, the concept of separatism demands more than an
institutional separation of church and state; it also commands that the
state should not become involved in religious affairs and that the body
politic should not be splintered along religious lines.
96
The Supreme Court has characterized the language in the estab-
lishment clause as "opaque" 97 and has struggled over the years to de-
fine the limits of the anti-establishment principle. Although it is
difficult to derive an unwavering meaning of the establishment clause,
it means at least that government may not prefer one religion over an-
other, or prefer religion over non-religion. In essence, the clause man-
dates the withdrawal of all state action in the religious sphere, at least
88. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 817-19 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as
TRIBE).
89. Id




94. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
95. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 818-19.
96. Id at 819.
97. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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to the extent that the free exercise clause does not compel such state
action; thus, the clause constructs a barrier between the church and the
state. This metaphor is misleading because almost all state action in-
volves some interaction between the religious and the secular. There-
fore, the Court has held that when government action touches upon the
religious sphere, in order to pass constitutional muster, the law must (1)
reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive en-
tanglement with religion.98 The following section of this note analyzes
this three-part establishment clause test.
The Secular Purpose Requirement
The requirement of a secular purpose is the threshold question in
establishment clause analysis. If legislation cannot be justified in secu-
lar terms, then the law clearly is inconsistent with the establishment
clause. The Court has not found much difficulty in finding a secular
purpose in reviewing various laws; it has attached an expansive mean-
ing to the term secular. When a law happens to coincide with the be-
liefs of one religion, the Court has shown reluctance to invalidate the
law if it can discern a secular purpose. Thus, the Court in analyzing
Sunday closing laws, said that: "The present .. .effect of most of
[these laws] is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens; the fact
that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance of the dominant
Christian sects, does not bar the state from achieving its secular
goals." 99 Even in the school prayer cases, at least some Justices argued
that the requirement of a secular purpose had been satisfied. l °°
The Court has given great deference to the legislative purpose of
the statutes and instead has used increased scrutiny in analyzing the
effect of the law and whether the law avoids excessive entanglement
with religion. For example, in a case involving public aid to religious
schools, Lemon v. Kurtzman,'0° the Court said that "the statutes them-
selves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the
secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance
laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything
else."1 02
98. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). The
Court first set forth the tripartite test in this case.
99. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
100. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-14, 223, 225 (1963) (Clark, J.).
101. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
102. Id at 613.
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The secular purpose requirement proved controlling in Epperson v.
ArkansasI0 3 which involved an establishment clause challenge to a law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools. The Court
found no "suggestion. . . [that] the Arkansas' law [could] be justified
by considerations of state policy other than [a desire to further] the
religious views of some of its citizens."1°4 The Court found the absence
of any secular purpose controlling: "The overriding fact is that [the
law] selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it
proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a partic-
ular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group." 0 5 Therefore, the in-
quiry into the purpose of the challenged law seems relatively limited.
If the Court is able to find any secular purpose, even when the law
evolved from other purposes that are arguably nonsecular, the Court
will probably rely upon the secular purpose and proceed to the remain-
ing two prongs of the establishment clause analysis.
The Secular Effect Requirement
The requirement that a law have a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion is fundamental to establishment clause
analysis. °0 However, the primary effect analysis impliedly raises ques-
tions as to when an effect is primary and when it is incidental. For
instance, ordinances or laws providing for general municipal services
necessarily have the effect of aiding religious institutions. Yet, these
laws are not deemed invalid merely because the purely secular effect
happens to be realized in a religious context. If the judiciary invali-
dated such laws because they fortuitously benefit religious activities,
the state would be singling out religious activities for hostile treatment
in violation of the first amendment. When a specific government pro-
gram has both religious and secular effects, the judiciary must decide
which effect predominates.
The United States Supreme Court has avoided an analysis which
would require inquiry into which effect is "primary" and which effect is
103. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
104. Id at 107.
105. Id at 103. The secular purpose analysis seems to be such a low threshold test that con-
curring Justice Black found this approach unpersuasive. The Court, Black argued, had chosen to
look only at the nonsecular purpose and to ignore the secular purpose of the law. Id at 111-12
(Black, J., concurring).
106. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39
(1973).
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"secondary."' 0 7 The Court has denied that "such metaphysical distinc-
tions are either possible or necessary."' 10 8 Instead, the Court has substi-
tuted an equally metaphysical approach: "Our cases simply do not
support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect [that
promotes] some legitimate [secular goal] is immune from further exam-
ination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect
of advancing religion."' 9 The nonestablishment analysis focuses on
whether the nonsecular effects are indirect or incidental, rather than
whether the secular effect is primary.
One commentator persuasively argues that the determination of
whether the secular effect predominates hinges on whether the secular
impact is separable from the religious impact. 10 Even when a govern-
ment program has a secular purpose and some secular effects, the es-
tablishment clause will prohibit the government program when the
religious benefits are inseparable from the secular benefits. Under this
analysis, the government may not allow Bible readings in public
schools because the secular benefit of promoting a broad educational
experience is inseparable from the sponsorship of religious activities.'
Roemer v. Board of Public Works 1 2 illustrates the other end of the
separability analysis. That case involved governmental aid to private,
religiously-sponsored universities and colleges. The Court held that
despite religious sponsorship of the institutions, the schools were not
"pervasively sectarian." 1 3 The Court found that the colleges per-
formed essentially secular functions" 14 and that the aid to such institu-
tions did not have the primary effect of advancing religion. The
Roemer Court concluded that the secular effects obtained were separa-
ble from the religious effects due to the essentially nonsectarian nature
of the benefited institutions.' '5
Another factor closely related to whether the sectarian effect of a
law is separable from the secular effect of a law is the breadth of the
class of people benefited by such laws." 6 While the secular and reli-




110. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 840.
111. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
112. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
113. Id at 755. The colleges received no funds from religious institutions; students were not
selected on the basis of religion. Id at 755-59.
114. Id at 755-61.
115. Id
116. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 840-45.
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unconstitutional because the benefited class is essentially religiously
oriented. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist,1 17 the narrowness of the benefited class was a key factor in find-
ing the program inconsistent with the establishment clause."18 The
Court struck down a tax relief program for the parents of nonpublic
school children where over eighty percent of the benefited class was
religiously oriented." 19
On the other end of the spectrum lies Walz v. Commissioner 20
which involved a challenge to tax exemption for religious institutions.
In Walz, the Court focused on the fact that the state had not singled out
religion for preferential treatment but instead had granted religious or-
ganizations the same tax status as other non-profit, quasi-public organi-
zations. 121 Thus, if religious organizations are granted benefits only as
part of- a program that benefits a larger group of organizations, the
Court will view the effects as incidental instead of direct.
Perhaps one of the major reasons for inquiry into separability and
the breadth of the benefited class is the symbolic impact of government
programs. When the secular and nonsecular effects of a government
program are inseparable or the class benefited by a program is essen-
tially religiously oriented, the government program symbolically ap-
pears to be religious. Such programs erode the underlying policies of
the first amendment, that is, separatism and voluntarism.122 The prin-
ciple of voluntarism is undermined because the programs portray reli-
gion as occupying a preferred status within the state and because any
particularly aided religions may appear to be unable to survive without
state support. 23 The concept of separatism is violated because the
public may perceive such aid as a breach of the "wall" between church
and state. 124
The Requirement of No Excessive Entanglement
The third prong of the anti-establishment analysis, that the gov-
ernment avoid any excessive entanglement with sectarian activity,
evolved from the desire to minimize government intrusion into the reli-
117. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
118. Id at 768.
119. Id
120. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
121. Id at 673.




gious realm. 25 The anti-entanglement analysis first appeared in Walz
v. Commissioner. 26 In Wa/z, one of the reasons for upholding a law
exempting religious organizations from property taxes was to avoid ex-
cessive government entanglement in sectarian affairs. 127 Some mem-
bers of the Court have criticized the anti-entanglement requirement as
merely an element of the secular effect analysis. 28 Proponents of the
requirement argue that the secular effect analysis is essentially substan-
tive, while the entanglement analysis focuses on the procedural in-
volvement of a government program in sectarian affairs.129 Regardless
of whether the anti-entanglement analysis is procedural or substantive,
it is clear that the analysis reaffirms the principle that the first amend-
ment was intended to inhibit "a union of government and religion that
tends to destroy government and degrade religion."' 130
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of prohibited inter-
action, political entanglement and administrative entanglement.' 3' Po-
litical entanglement refers to government programs that formulate
public decisions along religious lines; the prohibition evolves from the
fear of church intrusion into politics. 32 Administrative entanglement
focuses directly on the institutional contacts between religion and gov-
ernment; the prohibition reflects the fear that uninhibited government
action might intrude into the religious domain. 33
The concept of administrative entanglement seems applicable in
the analysis of religious employment discrimination because any suit
brought under title VII necessarily involves an inquiry into whether the
alleged discrimination was based on religion. Entanglement of this sort
arises in two forms. First is the proscription of excessive government
surveillance and evaluation of religious institutions. Thus, for exam-
ple, in evaluating tax exemptions for religious bodies, the Supreme
Court emphasized that eliminating the exemption would lead to "tax
valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and direct con-
frontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes."' 134 While invalidating state salary supplements to teachers
in religious schools, the Court noted the difficulty in separating the sec-
125. Id
126. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1963).
127. Id
128. See Roehmer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
129. Id at 755.
130. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
131. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 866.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
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ular and religious aspects of a teacher's style of instruction and that the
state would be required to ascertain that "subsidized teachers do not
inculcate religion." 135 To enforce this statute, the state would have had
to partake in "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance" of the teachers' activities,1 36 which would have resulted in
"excessive and enduring entanglement between State and Church."'1 37
A second form of administrative entanglement involves judicial
resolution of internal church disputes 3 and judicial inquiry into
whether a claimed belief is religious as opposed to ethical or political.
The first case involving judicial resolution of internal church disputes
was Watson v. Jones.139 In Watson, the Court emphasized that judicial
inquiry into matters of religious belief and ritual "would lead to a total
subversion of religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by [a church's inter-
nal dispute resolution process] could appeal to a secular court and have
them reversed."' 40 This analysis reflects the conviction that govern-
ment must preserve the independence of religious doctrine. Thus, the
core of this theory is that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."' 4'
A leading case in this area is Presbyterian Church of the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.1 42
This case arose out of a conflict between the national church and a
local congregation. Supporters of the national church contended that
the local congregation had departed from established Presbyterian doc-
trine and that therefore the property belonging to the local congrega-
tion should revert to the national body. The Georgia Supreme Court
inquired into whether the local congregation had actually departed
from established church doctrine. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that both the free exercise clause and the establish-
ment clause prohibit this type of inquiry. In this regard, the Court
stated:
[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes .... If civil
courts undertake to resolve [disputes over church doctrine] in order
135. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
136. Id
137. Id
138. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memo-
rial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), which is discussed in the text accompanying notes
142-43 infra.
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
140. Id at 729.
141. Id at 728.
142. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of
inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicat-
ing secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical con-
cern .... 143
Thus, civil courts are prohibited from resolving the underlying dispute
over religious doctrine.
Judicial inquiry into whether or not a specific belief is religious is
also severly limited. A leading case in this area is United States v. Bal-
lard,144 a mail fraud prosecution where the defendants solicited funds
on the representation that they were divine messengers. The Court
held that the sincerity, but not the truth, of the defendants' religious
beliefs could be analyzed by the fact-finder. Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, carefully circumscribed this inquiry by indicating that no
judge or jury had the power or competence to determine whether the
claimed religious experience had actually occurred. In this regard, Jus-
tice Douglas emphasized that:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is
basic in a society of free men. . . . It embraces the right to maintain
theories of life and death which are rank heresy to orthodox faith.
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their reli-
gious doctrines or beliefs . . . . The religious views espoused by re-
spondents seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But
if these doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with find-
ing their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake the task, they
enter a forbidden domain. 145
While Ballard was decided prior to the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the entanglement analysis, inquiry into an individual's reli-
gious beliefs seems to violate entanglement principles as much as
would an inquiry into a religious institution's doctrine. Unless the
Court is able to distinguish between religious institutions and religious
individuals, a distinction that seems clearly inconsistent with the first
amendment, the Ballard decision is applicable to the administrative en-
tanglement analysis. This second form of administrative entanglement
involving inquiry into an individual's religious beliefs is directly appli-
cable in religious discrimination claims. Ballard indicates that the trier
of fact can only look to whether the belief in question is sincerely held.
A similar approach was used in the conscientious objector cases,
143. Id at 449.
144. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
145. Id at 86-87.
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Welsh v. United States146 and United States v. Seeger. 47 In Welsh, the
Court stated that the "task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by
a [religious practitioner] are sincerely held and whether they are, in his
own scheme of things, religious."' 48 The Welsh case suggests a two-
pronged inquiry: (1) whether the belief is sincerely held and (2)
whether the belief, judged by the claimant's own standards, is reli-
gious. 149 However, even this inquiry should be carefully limited. For
example, an inquiry into sincerity necessarily involves the fact-finder's
use of a reasonableness standard, because the more reasonable a belief
appears, the more likely it will be accepted as sincerely held. The ulti-
mate inquiry should really be an inquiry into the employee's subjective
beliefs. But to the extent that the entanglement analysis insures reli-
gious liberty by prohibiting judicial involvement with religious doc-
trine, civil courts must play a limited role in analyzing claimed
religious beliefs. Thus, the administrative entanglement principle does
not prohibit adjudication of religious discrimination claims, but it does
circumscribe the court's role in such cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION RULE
The constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule has
been questioned in several cases. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. ,150 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the rule as
constitutional. On the other hand, the United States District Court for
the Central District of California in You v. North American Rockwell
Corp. ,'15' and the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania in Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,152 found the rea-
sonable accommodation rule unconstitutional. This note will now ana-
lyze and compare the approaches of these courts.
146. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
147. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
148. 398 U.S. at 339, quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
149. While this approach arose in a different definitional context, the EEOC appears to have
adopted the Welsh approach by looking to whether the beliefs are "as deeply and sincerely held as
more conventional religious convictions." EEOC Dec. 71-779, 3 FEP 172, 173 (1970). But see
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1974) where the court stated in
dicta that the conscientious objector approach was not similar.
150. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
151. 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal.) (1977), aft'd, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding as to the scope
of the employer's duty to accommodate. Thus, the Ninth Circuit had no reason to confront the
constitutional issue. Id at 909.
152. 18 FEP 1431 (V.D. Pa. 1979).
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Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.
As previously discussed, Parker Seal involved a religious discrimi-
nation claim by a Sabbath observer. 15 3 Because the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the employer had not
fulfilled its duty to accommodate, the court was obliged to confront the
claim that the rule was unconstitutional. The court applied the secular
purpose, secular effect, and entanglement analysis emanating from the
establishment clause. 154
The Sixth Circuit advanced two reasons for sustaining the rule
under the secular purpose analysis. First, the rule was developed "to
put teeth in the existing prohibition of religious discrimination."'' 55
Second, the court reasoned that "the reasonable accommodation rule
reflects a legislative judgment that, as a practical matter, certain per-
sons will not compromise their religious convictions and that they
should not be punished for supremacy of conscience."'' 56 The majority
of the court supported this analysis by an analogy with Gillette v. United
States, 57 a Supreme Court case concerning an establishment clause
challenge to a draft exemption statute. The Gillette Court had found
that the exemption for conscientious objectors evolved from a valid sec-
ular purpose because the exemption resulted from the pragmatic con-
cern that it would be difficult to convert conscientious objectors into
fighting men. The Court concluded that it was permissible for Con-
gress to avoid "clashes with the dictates of conscience" by promoting
free exercise values. 58 The Parker Seal court's reliance on Gillette
seems inappropriate. In the draft cases, because the religious exemp-
tion was arguably compelled by the free exercise clause, the Gillette
Court was forced to tread that thin line between free exercise and anti-
establishment values. Recognizing this inherent tension, the Court up-
held the draft exemption. The reasonable accommodation rule, on the
other hand, is not compelled by the free exercise clause due to the ab-
sence of state action.'59 Thus, the tension between the two religion
153. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
154. Id. at 551-52.
155. Id at 552.
156. Id
157. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
158. Id at 453.
159. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. inhibiting or pro-
moting religion. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Thus, by its own terms, the first amendment speaks only
to congressional action. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the first amendment
was held to be incorporated through the fourteenth amendment as fundamental to our concept of
liberty. The fourteenth amendment relates only to state action by providing that "[n]o state shall
• . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
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clauses is not inherently present. In this way, the court's analogy seems
inappropriate.
The Parker Seal court also upheld the reasonable accommodation
rule under the secular effect analysis. The court noted that the estab-
lishment clause only prohibits laws that directly advance or inhibit reli-
gion, not laws that confer incidental benefits on religion. 60 Thus, the
court concluded that the effect of the accommodation requirement was
to "inhibit discrimination, not to advance religion."' 6' The court also
noted that the rule "mandate[s] no financial support, direct or indirect,
for religious institutions, a factor [the court found] significant in view of
the traditional characterization of such governmental aid as one of the
primary evils against which the establishment clause protects."' 162
The court's analysis in this respect seems somewhat simplistic. It
is true that the establishment clause prohibits financial aid to religious
institutions, but its values extend beyond outright financial aid to reli-
gious organizations. For example, the establishment clause has been
held to prohibit individualized salary supplements to parochial school
teachers because of the concern that such aid would advance reli-
gion.' 63 In addition, the primary effect analysis is not limited to
financial aid alone. The Supreme Court, in Engle v. Vitale,164 invali-
dated a public school prayer program under the establishment clause.
In this way, the establishment clause prohibits many kinds of govern-
ment assistance to religion.
The Parker Seal court also found the accommodation rule consis-
tent with anti-entanglement principles. 165 Noting that the reasonable
accommodation rule will not involve continuous contacts between a re-
ligious organization or individual and the state, and that the inquiry in
a religious discrimination case is no more exacting than the determina-
tion of whether a religious organization qualifies for a tax exemption,
the court saw no violation of entanglement principles.
The dissent in Parker Seal criticizes the majority's analysis for
failing to grasp the fact that "if Congress is permitted to breach the
First Amendment by granting benefits to religion, it is thereby empow-
amend. XIV. Accordingly, purely private activity such as religious discrimination by private em-
ployers cannot contravene the first amendment. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883).
160. 516 F.2d at 553.
161. Id
162. Id
163. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
164. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
165. 516 F.2d at 553-54.
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ered to breach it to take away religious freedoms."' 166 The dissent
found that the reasonable accommodation rule was not justified by a
valid secular purpose. Citing Senator Randolf, the author of the rea-
sonable accommodation amendment to title VII, 16 7 the dissent argued
that the purpose behind the rule is the "promotion of certain religions
whose followers' practices conflict with employers' schedules.' 1 68
The dissent also found the rule inconsistent with the secular effect
requirement. Arguing that the reasonable accommodation rule dis-
criminates between religion and nonreligion, the dissent reasoned that
other employees would be forced to bear the burden caused by the em-
ployers' accommodation of religious practitioners. 69 Also, the dissent
argued that the rule discriminates among religions because:
[O]nly those [religions] which require their followers to manifest
their beliefs in acts requiring modification of an employer's work
rules benefit, while other employees are inconvenienced by the em-
ployer's accommodation. By singling out particular sects for govern-
ment protection, the Federal Government has forfeited the pretense
that the rule is merely part of a general ban on religious discrimina-
tion. ' 70
The dissent saw no need to analyze the rule under entanglement princi-
ples because the rule was inconsistent with the establishment clause in
both purpose and effect.' 7'
You v. North American Rockwell Corp.
Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp. 172 involved a religious dis-
crimination claim against an employer and union. The employee
claimed that his religious convictions prohibited his compliance with
the collective bargaining agreement; he refused to pay union dues. 173
He suggested the following accommodations: (1) that he be given a job
outside the bargaining unit; (2) that he be exempted from union secur-
ity provision; or (3) that he be reinstated in his old job at a lower pay
rate, presumably to pay union dues from that difference. 174 The de-
fendants challenged such accommodations because they would be ille-
gal or, even if they were legal, they would be only temporary because
166. Id at 554-55 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
167. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
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of further union organizing efforts. 75 Also, the defendants challenged
the reasonable accommodation rule on constitutional grounds.176 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California re-
fused to order such accommodation and also addressed the constitu-
tional issue.
The You court's analysis of the constitutional issue focused on the
scope of the employer's duty to accommodate. The court concluded
that applying the reasonable accommodation rule would require em-
ployers to treat employees unequally on the basis of their religion. 77
The court then emphasized that governmental neutrality is the corner-
stone of first amendment values.' 78 When Congress decided that other-
wise nondiscriminatory conduct should be modified to conform to
religious beliefs, it had breached this neutrality principle. 79 The rea-
sonable accommodation rule was inconsistent with the first amend-
ment. 8 0
While the district court's analysis could have been more extensive,
the court expressed the same concerns that troubled the Trans World
Court and the dissent in Parker Seal. While title VII originally banned
the use of certain criteria as factors in employment decision-making,
the reasonable accommodation rule conflicts with this concept by com-
manding that preferences be distributed on the basis of one of those
same criteria. The Yott court went further than the majority in Trans
World by acknowledging that such religious preferences are not only
inconsistent with the title VII antidiscrimination mandate,' 8 ' but that
such conduct is also inconsistent with the Constitution.
Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.
In Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,t82 plaintiff, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, was employed as a service operator at defendant's company. One
of his job assignments was raising and lowering the American flag.
Plaintiff refused to do so, asserting that this act conflicted with his reli-
gious beliefs. When he was discharged for this refusal, he brought a
175. Id
176. Id
177. Id at 766.
178. Id at 767.
179. Id
180. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding as to the scope of the employer's duty to accommodate. Thus, the Ninth Circuit had no
reason to confront the constitutional issue. 602 F.2d at 909.
181. 428 F. Supp. at 766.
182. 18 FEP 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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religious discrimination action. The company alleged that the reason-
able accommodation rule violated the Constitution. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sustained this
allegation and dismissed Gavin's complaint.
The Gavin court analyzed the case under the tripartite establish-
ment clause standards. The court recognized that good arguments
could be made on both sides of the secular purpose analysis. First, the
court looked to the legislative history of the reasonable accommodation
rule. The court concluded that the remarks of Senator Randolf, who
introduced the amendment, arguably indicated that the rule was moti-
vated by "sectarian impulses."' 83 On the other hand, the court noted
that the reasonable accommodation rule could be justified in light of
the larger purposes of title VII, the prevention of discrimination in em-
ployment. 84
Under the secular effect analysis, the Gavin court acknowledged
that religion in general and particularly the adherents of certain faiths
derived some benefits from the rule. 85 The court then considered
whether that effect was primary or merely incidental.1 86 While the
court did not actually decide this issue, it recognized that the company
had raised substantial constitutional questions. 8 7
The court addressed the entanglement issues raised by the em-
ployee's complaint. The court had considerable difficulty with this is-
sue and concluded that it could not constitutionally adjudicate the
employee's claim. First, the court discussed the differences between
claims based on religious discrimination and claims arising from the
use of other impermissible criteria, such as sex or race. The court noted
that racial and sexual discrimination were banned by title VII in part
because " 'they are immutable characteristics determined by accidents
of birth' and 'traits for which the individuals bear no responsibil-
ity.' "188 In contrast, the court emphasized that religions, or religious
beliefs, are not so easily defined or determined. The court explained
that to adjudicate the religious discrimination claim, it would be forced
to determine whether the alleged religious belief was bona fide.' 89 To
do this, the court concluded, would require the admission and evalua-
183. Id at 1435.
184. Id at 1436.
185. Id at 1436-37.
186. Id at 1437.
187. Id
188. Id at 1438, quoting Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav., 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366
(1979).
189. 18 FEP at 1438.
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tion of expert testimony from adherents of the employee's particular
religious sect. The Gavin court concluded that such an inquiry was in-
consistent with the establishment clause. 90
The court also analyzed two possible avenues to avoid this prob-
lem, but concluded that the result of the case would be no different.
First, the term religion could be defined so as to include anything an
employee believes to be religious.' 9 1 The court objected to such an ex-
pansive definition of religion because it would create havoc in the
workplace. Additionally, "such a reading [could] create due process
problems for employers who would have no way of implementing such
a broad and vague scheme wherein they [are] charged with an affirma-
tive duty to accommodate."' 92 The second avenue would be to decide
that the employee's belief was not religious as a matter of law. 193 How-
ever, the court believed that this determination would require interpret-
ing the statute to protect only common religious beliefs and such a
narrow interpretation would raise serious establishment clause objec-
tions. 194 Apparently feeling that a district court was not the proper fo-
rum for resolution, the court dismissed the complaint and suggested
that these doctrinally difficult issues are more appropriately reviewed
in an appellate court. 95 In so holding, the court recognized serious
constitutional challenges under the purpose and effect prongs of the
establishment clause analysis. However, the anti-entanglement prong
proved to be the more difficult issue. The court, faced with the issue of
whether or not a belief is religious, refused to decide the issue because
of the serious constitutional issues inherent in such a determination.
Summary of Judicial Opinions of the Constitutionality of the
Reasonable Accommodation Rule
These three cases represent the divergent views taken by the
courts. The Parker Seal majority had no problems in holding the rea-
sonable accommodation rule consistent with the establishment clause.
The dissent, however, found the rule inconsistent with the establish-
ment clause in both purpose and effect. The Yott court, on the other
hand, did not even apply the tripartite standards of the establishment
clause, but instead focused on the neutrality principal underlying the
190. Id at 1439.
191. Id This is essentially the same approach used in the conscientious objector cases. See
text accompanying notes 146-49 supra.





first amendment. According to You, Congress breached this neutrality
principle by enacting the reasonable accommodation rule. The Gavin
court, like the Parker Seal court, applied the establishmeht clause stan-
dards, but it reached an opposite result. The Gavin decision saw the
reasonable accommodation rule as arguably violative of the establish-
ment clause in purpose and effect, but seemed to show most concern
over the entanglement prong of the test. Thus, the Gavin court held
that it was constitutionally impermissible to adjudicate the religious
discrimination claim.
ANALYSIS OF THE PURPOSE OF THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
RULE
The legislative history of the reasonable accommodation rule
clearly shows that the rule evolved from sectarian motives. Senator
Randolf, the bill's sponsor, explained that the rule was intended to help
prevent the dwindling memberships of some religions allegedly due to
religious conflicts in the employment area and that religious liberty as
guaranteed by the first amendment should be given some meaning in
the employment context. 196 Clearly, these goals seem nonsecular. As
noted in the Parker Seal' 97 decision, the reasonable accommodation
rule's purpose may also be justified by looking to the policies support-
ing title VII. The reasonable accommodation rule may be viewed as a
device necessary for achieving the broad goals of title VII. As noted by
the Gavin'98 court, both of these arguments seem plausible. Thus, the
reasonable accommodation rule arguably is supported by two pur-
poses, one secular and one nonsecular.
The first prong of the establishment clause analysis requires that a
law have a valid secular purpose. The current analysis of the secular
purpose seems to be a low threshold test. 199 Thus, if the court is able to
find any valid secular purpose, then the law will probably withstand
the first prong of the establishment clause test.200 The reasonable ac-
commodation rule evolved from two purposes, the secular purpose in
furthering nondiscrimination on a religious basis and the nonsecular
goal of furthering the practice of religion. Under the low level of in-
quiry involved in the secular purpose analysis, the reasonable accom-
modation rule is consistent with the establishment clause. When faced
196. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 150-65 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 182-95 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 99-105 supra.
200. Id
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with a choice between two competing purposes, one secular and the
other nonsecular, the secular purpose alone will justify the reasonable
accommodation rule.
ANALYSIS OF THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION RULE AND THE
REQUIREMENTS OF No EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENTS
The Gavin court found that anti-entanglement principles prohib-
ited the adjudication of an employee's religious discrimination
claim.20' However, this holding is probably not commanded by the
requirement that government avoid excessive entanglement. The anti-
entanglement principle merely limits the scope of judicial inquiry into
a claimed religious belief. It requires that a court focus on the claim-
ant's sincerity in claiming to possess a belief which is religious in the
individual's own scheme of things. Courts, however, have tended to
focus on the sincerity of the religious belief. In Hansard v. Jones-
Manville Products Corp. ,202 plaintiff allegedly had held a lifelong con-
viction against Sunday work, yet accepted a job that required Sunday
work. He worked on Sundays until shortly before his discharge. The
court concluded that he had not demonstrated the "requisite sincerity
of religious convictions. ' 20 3 However, in Kettel v. Johnson & John-
son,2°4 the plaintiffs conviction against Saturday work was held sincere
although he had been a member of the same church, with the same
Sabbath doctrine, for several years before he made a "New Year's reso-
lution" against Sunday work.20 5 Thus, courts have not seemed to ac-
cept the dual analysis enunciated in the Welsh-Seeger conscientious
objector cases, 2° 6 but instead have focused on the element of sincerity.
The anti-entanglement principles of the establishment clause
would probably permit analysis of whether a belief, in the plaintiffs
own scheme of things, is religious. However, a more exacting inquiry
into the truth or falsity of the belief would clearly be inconsistent with
the establishment clause.20 7 Thus, the anti-entanglement requirement
circumscribes the employer's ability to challenge the employee's claim.
The net effect of this is to expand the class of possible claims of em-
ployees who may argue that their conduct is religiously motivated.
201. See text accompanying notes 182-95 supra.
202. 5 FEP 707 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
203. ld at 708.
204. 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
205. Id at 893.
206. See text accompanying notes 146-49 supra.
207. Id
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Gavin recognized this dilemma. 20 8 However, this possibility alone does
not render the reasonable accommodation rule inconsistent with the
requirement of no excessive entanglement.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECULAR EFFECT AND THE REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION RULE
The threshold question under this analysis is what is the effect of
the reasonable accommodation requirement. First, the rule has the ef-
fect of treating the failure to accommodate as equivalent to religious
discrimination. 20 9 Unlike discrimination by disparate impact, 2t 0 the
reasonable accommodation rule places the burden on the employer to
show that no accommodation is possible without undue hardship.
Thus, the burden on the plaintiff to set out a prima facie case for reli-
gious discrimination is decreased. The other effects of the rule may be
explained by examining the class of plaintiffs who benefit by the rule.
First, the rule benefits religious practitioners. More specifically,
the rule only benefits those religious practitioners whose specific reli-
gion requires adherence to some particular doctrine or practice which
needs accommodation. Second, the rule benefits society in general by
prohibiting religious discrimination in the employment context. This is
supported by the fact that religious discrimination was prohibited in
title VII's original statutory scheme.21' To the extent that the reason-
able accommodation rule facilitates title VII's goals, the rule works a
benefit to society. Another effect may be derived by examining the dif-
ferences between the reasonable accommodation rule and the original
ban on religious discrimination. To some extent, this analysis is specu-
lative because the reasonable accommodation rule arose early in title
VII's history through EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination. 21 2
An inquiry into the treatment of other forms of discrimination is help-
ful. Title VII, as announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,213 can be
violated by facially neutral employment policies that nevertheless re-
sult in a disparate impact among certain classes. 214 If disparate impact
is shown, the employer may justify its neutral employment policy by a
showing of business necessity. The reasonable accommodation rule
also proscribes neutral employment policies that have a disparate im-
208. See text accompanying notes 182-95 supra.
209. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
210. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
211. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
213. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
214. Id at 430.
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pact. However, under the reasonable accommodation rule, the policy
may only be justified by a showing that accommodation would result in
undue hardship.
The touchstone of business necessity is whether the rule is some-
how related to job performance. 21 5 Thus, if a religious practitioner re-
fused to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath, then an employer's rule
requiring Saturday work would be justified by a business necessity be-
cause the rule is reasonably related to job performance.
Whether the same rule would be justified under the undue hard-
ship test is not entirely clear. Under a Trans World analysis, 21 6 to the
extent that such accommodation would require a breach of a seniority
system or would result in more than de minimis costs, no accommoda-
tion would be required. However, absent these factors, the employer
would be required to grant employment preferences on a religious ba-
sis. In this way, the reasonable accommodation rule goes beyond a typ-
ical disparate impact analysis.
Thus, the effects of the reasonable accommodation rule may be
summarized as follows: it equates the failure to accommodate with re-
ligious discrimination and thus requires preferential treatment without
a prior finding of discrimination; and it benefits religious employees, as
opposed to the nonreligious or those whose religions do not conflict
with the employer's rules.
Applying these effects to the secular effect analysis requires an in-
quiry into both the separability of the secular and nonsecular effects
and the breadth of the benefited class.217 The first effect, that of equat-
ing failure to accommodate with religious discrimination, seems clearly
nonsecular. It goes beyond merely preventing discrimination, but in-
stead places an affirmative obligation upon employers. In the area of
race or sexual discrimination, an employer must only grant preferential
treatment to remedy a judicially-found history of discrimination. The
reasonable accommodation rule, on the other hand, requires preferen-
tial treatment prior to any judicial finding of discrimination. The net
effect of the rule is to place the remedy before the determination of any
illegal conduct.
The second effect seems clearly secular. While it is true that only
religious practitioners or religious practitioners whose jobs conflict with
work schedules benefit from the rule, these effects are no different than
215. Id at 431.
216. See text accompanying notes 51-81 supra.
217. Id
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the original ban on religious discrimination contained in title VII. To
the extent that the original ban on religious discrimination was secular
in effect, so is the reasonable accommodation rule. In essence, this is a
restatement of the proposition that the reasonable accommodation rule
facilitates title VII's ban on religious discrimination.
These effects are not sufficiently separable to be consistent with the
secular effect of the establishment clause analysis. An analogy to the
school prayer cases may be helpful. There, the effects of promoting a
broad educational experience and promoting religions were insepara-
ble and thus the program violated the establishment clause. In essence,
the two effects merged into one. The same is true of the reasonable
accommodation rule. The reasonable accommodation rule facilitates
title VII's ban on religious discrimination, but it does so by requiring,
at least in some cases, preferential treatment on a religious basis. The
secular and nonsecular effects of the rule merge. Thus, the rule is in-
consistent with the first prong of the secular effect analysis.
The breadth of the benefited class bolsters the argument that the
reasonable accommodation rule is inconsistent with the establishment
clause. The rule does not benefit merely religious practitioners but
only those religious practitioners whose beliefs clash with neutral work
policies. As the dissent pointed out in Parker Seal, the reasonable ac-
commodation rule discriminates among religions.218 The benefited
class is not all religious practitioners, but merely a sub-class of that
class. Unlike Walz v. Commissioner, where the benefited class included
religious and nonreligious organizations, 219 the reasonable accommo-
dation rule benefits a very narrow class. The symbolic effect of the rule
is that a specific religious group is being singled out for special treat-
ment. The Parker Seal case illustrates this perception. There, the em-
ployee was fired, not so much for his refusal to work on his Sabbath,
but because the employer's initial accommodation of his refusal led to
dissension among his fellow employees. 220
Thus, the reasonable accommodation rule conflicts with the first
amendment. It undermines the concept of voluntarism by creating the
appearance that the specific religions benefited by the rule are unable
to stand on their own merits. It conflicts with the concept of separatism
by creating the appearance that the benefited religions are being aided
218. 516 F.2d at 558 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
219. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
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by the government. Therefore, the reasonable accommodation rule vi-
olates the establishment clause.
CONCLUSION
This note has discussed the evolution of title VII's ban on religious
discrimination. Title VII's original ban on religious discrimination
surely promoted religious liberty in the United States. Title VII gave
some meaning to the idea of the free exercise of religion in the context
of private activities. However, by subsequently adding the reasonable
accommodation rule, Congress went beyond merely prohibiting reli-
gious discrimination. Instead, Congress mandated unequal treatment
on a religious basis. By so doing, Congress not only extended the scope
of title VII, but it also blurred the separation between church and state.
Under the secular purpose analysis of the establishment clause, the
law is valid. While the law arguably evolved from sectarian impulses,
the reasonable accommodation rule can be justified as a means neces-
sary to facilitate the broad purpose of title VII, that is, the prevention of
discrimination in employment. The reasonable accommodation rule
also does not violate the anti-entanglement prong of the establishment
clause. Instead, the anti-entanglement principle merely circumscribes
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of a religious belief. However,
under the secular effect analysis, the reasonable accommodation rule
violates the establishment clause. First, the secular effect of preventing
discrimination and the nonsecular effect promoting religious activity
are inseparable. Second, the class benefited by the law is limited to that
class of religious employees whose beliefs are inconsistent with other-
wise neutral work policies. The reasonable accommodation rule dis-
criminates both between religion and nonreligion and among specific
religions. Thus, the law contravenes the establishment clause. If Con-
gress has the power to promote religious liberty in this way, then the
converse is also true and Congress would have the power to suppress
religious liberties. Such is not the-case and the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule is an impermissible intrusion by government into the religious
sphere.
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